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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
——

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 20010809-SC

v.

Ct.App. No. 20000541-CA

ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,
Defendant-Respondent.

Priority No. 13

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in
State v. Wanosik* 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615 (addendum A), which vacated
defendant's sentence imposed in absentia.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(a) (Supp.
2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. When a defendant is notified of his sentencing hearing, but fails to appear,
must the State produce evidence that it has searched for the defendant before the
trial court can presume that the defendant is voluntarily absent?
On a writ of certiorari, this CourtfcWreview[s]the court of appeals' decision for
correctness and gives its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. v.
Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). Who has the burden of proof or the

burden of production and what evidence suffices to meet that burden are legal questions.
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 2 4 1 4 8.
2. Does Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, require a trial court to
affirmatively seek sentencing input from (a) defense counsel and (b) the prosecutor,
even without a request or objection?
The interpretation of a rule is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness.
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16 P.3d 540.
3. When a trial court sentences a defendant without seeking sentencing input
from both defense counsel and the prosecutor, is the resulting sentence "a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner" under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., subject to
challenge at any time?
This question also requires interpretation of a rule. Review is therefore for
correctness. Id.
4. When a trial court sentences a defendant without seeking sentencing input
from both defense counsel and the prosecutor, is the resultant sentence ipso facto a
sentence based on unreliable information in violation of the defendant's due process
rights?
Issues of constitutional interpretation are issues of law. State v. Valencia, 2001
UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573. Review is again for correctness. Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following provision, set forth is addendum B, is relevant to this appeal:
Rule 22, Utah R. Cnm. P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a
class A misdemeanor, and to unlawful possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor,
both in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). R. 18-24,27-28.
The court accepted defendant's guilty plea, informed him that sentencing was set for May
26, 2000, and ordered him to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for
preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). R. 27-28.
Defendant appeared at AP&P, and a PSI was prepared. R. 52. He did not,
however, appear for sentencing. R. 29-32. He was not in custody, having been released
on personal recognizance to pretrial services. R. 11. He had contacted neither his
counsel nor the court, and defense counsel had been unable to locate him. R. 54:2-3. The
sentencing court found that defendant had voluntarily absented himself from sentencing,
sentenced him in absentia, revoked his release, and ordered issuance of a nonbailable
arrest warrant. R. 30-31, 36. The trial court imposed a one-year prison term for
attempted possession of methamphetamine and a concurrent six-month term for
possession of marijuana. R. 54:3.

3

Defense counsel timely appealed. R. 39. When finally apprehended, defendant
sent the trial court a letter acknowledging: "I do not have a legitimate excuse" for not
appeanng at sentencing. R. 66 (emphasis in onginal). The court of appeals unanimously
vacated defendant's sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. Id. at
«J33.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the probable cause statement, a police officer observed defendant
"rummaging through donated items at Deseret Industries" at 2120 South Highland Dnve
in Salt Lake County. R. 6. When the officer saw defendant pick up and pocket
something, he decided to stop defendant for theft. Id. A computer check revealed an
outstanding warrant, and defendant was arrested. Id. In a search incident to the arrest,
the police officer found a gas torch nozzle and nine small containers, three of them
holding a crystal substance that defendant identified as methamphetamine. Id. The
officer also located two pipes and five knives in defendant's pockets. Id. In a search
later at the jail, "two more bags of suspected methamphetamine and a bag of suspected
manjuana were found on defendant. R. 7. In his statement in support of his guilty plea,
defendant admitted that he possessed manjuana. R. 19.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ignonng controlling precedent and sound policy, the court of appeals imposed an
unreasonable burden of production on the State, effectively precluding the sentencing o(

4

4

*no show*' defendants. The court's opinion reverses the established presumption that an

absence is voluntary where the defendant has been notified of his sentencing hearing, but
is absent without explanation. The decision conflicts with decisions on the same issue
from this Court and from another panel of the court of appeals.
Further, the court of appeals' opinion effectively forecloses the sentencing of
absent defendants by requiring the State to make extensive, expensive, and timeconsuming investigational inquiries into the possible reasons for a defendant's absence.
This aberrational requirement is inconsistent with Utah precedent, apparently without
precedent in any other jurisdiction, and contrary to sound policy.
The opinion also imposes a new affirmative duty on trial courts to solicit
sentencing input from defense counsel and from prosecutors where they neither ask to
present that information nor object to sentencing without it. This holding effectively
requires the trial court to "coach" legal counsel and encourages invited error.
The opinion further classifies a sentence imposed under these circumstances as i%a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner" subject to challenge at any time. This holding
opens the floodgates to legal challenges of sentencing decisions based on mere
speculation that (a) defense counsel or the prosecutor may have had information relevant
to sentencing, but was too timid or poorly trained to request an opportunity to speak, and
(t>) the information would likely have resulted in a more favorable sentence.

;>

Finally, the court of appeals' opinion holds that the sentence imposed in this case
violated defendant's due process rights. Because the tnal court discussed defendant's
absence, the court of appeals apparently presumed that the tnal court fixed its sentence
considering only defendant's absence from sentencing. The record contained other
evidence supporting the sentence, however, and the tnal court did not state the basis for
its sentencing decision. Where the record is silent regarding the factors considered by the
trial court, a reviewing court must accord a presumption of regularity to the proceedings
of a tnal court. Ignoring controlling precedent, the court of appeals imposed the opposite
presumption, i.e., a presumption of irregulanty.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER CONTROLLING AND SOUND PRECEDENT, A TRIAL
COURT MAY PRESUME THAT A DEFENDANT WHO HAS BEEN
NOTIFIED OF HIS SENTENCING HEARING, BUT FAILS TO
APPEAR, IS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT; THE STATE NEED NOT
SHOW THAT IT HAS SEARCHED FOR THE DEFENDANT
The court of appeals held that "a tnal court may not assume a defendant's
knowing absence is voluntary, but rather is required to determine whether a defendant's
absence is in fact voluntary." Wanosik, UT App 241, «[ 19. The court further held that
the State must make a "preliminary showing" that the defendant's absence is voluntary,
suggesting that the State meet this "preliminary burden" by inquiry of law enforcement
agencies, local hospitals, the defendant's emplover, pretnal services, and bail bond
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companies, and by attempting to contact the defendant at his residence or other places the
defendant is known to frequent. Id. at Ijlj 22-23.
The court of appeals' holding contravenes precedent established by this Court and
by another panel of the court of appeals. It imposes an aberrational and unworkable
burden on the State. Further, as the court of appeals' opinion acknowledges, it is usually
impossible to show "whether a defendant's absence is in fact voluntary." Id. at ^j 19.
The court observes that, even following the extensive inquiries mandated by this opinion,
voluntariness cannot be guarantied. Id. at <j23.
The effect of the court of appeals' opinion is to change the burden of production
established by precedent, requiring the State to engage in an expensive and timeconsuming investigation into the reasons for a defendant's absence before a defendant
may be presumed involuntarily absent. The change mandated is inconsistent with sound
policy where, as the court of appeals' opinion concedes, "the vast majority of court noshows" are, in fact, voluntary and where the judicial system provides adequate remedies
for the "tiny minority" who might be involuntarily absent without explanation. Id. at
«[20n.l0.
A.

Under controlling precedent a trial court may presume that a defendant who
has been notified of his sentencing hearing, but fails to appear, is voluntarily
absent
A defendant is "knowingly" absent when he has received notice of a court

proceeding, but does not appear. See Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,«[ 19 n.8. Whether he

i

is "voluntarily" absent is another question. A defendant is "voluntarily" absent when he
is free to attend but does not. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996).
A defendant is "involuntarily" absent if he cannot attend, for instance, because he is
incarcerated and his jailers will not permit his attendance or because he is comatose
following an accident. See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986).
Frequently, however, as in the present case, the trial court has no explanation for a
defendant's absence. The defendant simply does not appear. Defendant has not
contacted the court, his attorney, or the prosecutor—and neither has anyone else.
Voluntariness or involuntariness cannot be guaranteed, and a presumption must therefore
be made.
While court of appeals' opinion recognizes the need for a rebuttable presumption
of voluntariness, it shifts the point at which the presumption may be made. The court of
appeals' decision permits the presumption only after "a preliminary showing" of
voluntariness, i.e., after extensive investigation into a defendant's possible whereabouts,
tn establishing this new point at which the presumption may be employed, the court of
appeals'opinion contradicts established precedent.
The court of appeals' opinion holds, in fact, that a defendant who, despite
receiving notice, neither appears nor conveys a reason for his absence from sentencing
must be presumed involuntarily absent. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,1j 20 n. 10. That
presumption obtains even though defense counsel is present, but unable to give an

8

explanation. Id. at ^f 20. This allocation of the burden of production conflicts with
precedent established in State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), and State v.
Myers, 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973), decisions by this Court, and with State v. Wagstaff, 772
P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1989), a decision by another panel of the court of appeals.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction is Anderson. In Anderson, this Court held
that a defendant is voluntarily absent when he receives notice of a hearing and is "free to
attend" in the sense that he is "not incarcerated elsewhere." Id. at 1110. Observing that
xAnderson did not argue on appeal that he had not been at liberty to attend, this Court
upheld the trial court's determination that Anderson was voluntarily absent at sentencing.
In other words, once the State had met its burden to show that Anderson had notice, the
burden shifted to Anderson to present some reason for his absence.1 The Wanosik
holding conflicts with this decision.
In arriving at its decision in Anderson, this Court cited Wagstaff, a trial-in-absentia
case, where the court of appeals laid out the test for voluntariness. Anderson, 929 P.2d at
1110 (citing Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990). The "[voluntariness [of a defendant's absence
from his trial] is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances/' Id. at 990.
Applying this test, the court of appeals held that Wagstaff—who had sufficient notice

'Anderson, it turned out, did not have actual "official notice" of his sentencing
hearing. 929 P.2d at 1110. Observing that Anderson had "severed contact" with his own
attorney, the prosecution, and pretnal services, this Court held that notice was sufficient
because Anderson "would have known of the sentencing date" had he maintained contact
with his attorney and with pretnal services. Id. at 1111.
9

f

through his attorney, who presented no reason for his absence at tnal, and who presented
only an insufficient reason thereafter—was voluntanly absent. Id.
Again, once the State had met its burden to demonstrate that Wagstaff had been
given notice, the burden to present some sound reason for his absence shifted to
Wagstaff. "A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay away from the tnal. If his
absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Wanosik panel's presumption of
involuntariness conflicts with the Wagstaff decision by another court of appeals' panel.
The court of appeals' decision also conflicts with this Court's decision in Myers,
508 P.2d at 41, an earlier trial-in-absentia case. Observing that Myers knew when trial
would resume, this Court stated that Myers had 'Voluntarily and intentionally absconded."
Id. Myers gave no reason for his absence, and this Court affirmed his conviction, holding
that he had waived his nght to be present. Id. at 43.
In sum, in Anderson, Wagstaff, and Myers, Utah appellate courts reviewed and
affirmed trial court determinations that defendants had been voluntarily absent. The State
was not required in any of these cases to make a preliminary showing of voluntariness by
establishing that it had searched for the defendant at his residence, his place of
employment, jails, and hospitals or made inqumes of bail bondsmen and pretnal sen ices.
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1107; Wagstaff 111 P.2d at 987; Myers, 508 P.2d at 41.2
:

In State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), this Court reversed a defendant's
conviction, holding that the trial court had erred in finding the defendant voluntanly absent
10

Further, Utah's traditional allocation of the burden of production to a notified
defendant is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v.
Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant knew tnal date
and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant "ha[d] the burden of
going forward and offering evidence to refute the [voluntariness] finding of the tnal
court"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("When a defendant is
free on bond and does not appear at the time specified, it is presumed, until established
otherwise, that his absence is voluntary for the purpose of deciding whether he has
waived his right to be present at trial."); Moore v State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Cnm.
App. 1984) (en banc) ("Absent any evidence from the defendant to refute the tnal court's
determination that his absence was voluntarv, we will not disturb the tnal court's
finding.").
Finally, the burden of production imposed by the court of appeals is aberrational.
In its research, the State found no jurisdiction mandating extensive investigational
inquines like those that the court of appeals' opinion requires to rebut a presumption of
involuntariness.

when his trial commenced. In that case, the prosecutor advised the tnal court that the
defendant had been arrested in California for drunken dnving. The court nevertheless
proceeded with the trial. While the prosecutor, rather than defendant or defense counsel,
presented a legitimate reason for Houtz's absence, that case does not make the prosecutor,
rather than the defendant, responsible for producing a reason. Rather, it stands for the
proposition that when a reason has been presented, the tnal court must consider that reason
in its voluntariness determination.
11

In sum, the court of appeals' decision is contrary to its own precedent and to
precedent established by this Court. While voluntariness is determined from the totality
of the circumstances and the State has the burden of proving voluntariness, voluntariness
may be inferred from evidence that a defendant received notice. Once the State has
demonstrated adequate notice, a defendant has the burden of presenting at least some
sound reason for his absence.3 The court of appeals' opinion improperly reverses the
presumption and reallocates the burden of going forward.
B.

As a matter of sound policy, Utah should retain its current presumption of
voluntariness and reject the court of appeals' aberrational and unworkable
new rule.
The court of appeals apparently imposed its presumption of involuntariness and its

rebuttal requirements in an attempt to minimize the possibility that a defendant might be
sentenced in absentia when external circumstances prevented his attendance. The court
acknowledged, however, that most "no-show" defendants "got sidetracked in some
volitional way" and that "only a tiny minority find themselves comatose or otherwise
involuntarily incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 41,

*Utah appellate courts have implicitly held that their review of a tnal court's
voluntariness finding may extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling,
so long as the defendant gives the trial court an opportunity to consider the new evidence.
See State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 988-989 (reviewing affidavit filed with motion for a new
tnal eight months after tnal in absentia); State v. Coles, 688 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1984)
(reviewing evidence that defendant's absence was due to a mistake of counsel proffered
dunng arguments on motion to set aside judgment).
12

*! 20 n.10. The court therefore imposed this heavy burden for the benefit of that "tiny
minority."
That benefit does not justify the onerous burden of production imposed. Failure to
appear is all too common injudicial proceedings. During the time approximately
concurrent with the progress of this appeal through the appellate system, the State has
addressed at least eight other cases appealing sentencing-in-absentia proceedings.4 This
number does not, of course, include sentencing-in-absentia cases where no appeal was
filed. The cases generally involve convictions for non-violent crimes such as drug
possession. The defendants have generally been released on bail or to the supervision of
pretrial services because they do not pose an unusual danger to the community.
In view of the large number of cases and the nature of the underlying offenses, the
likelihood that county prosecutors will divert their limited resources to the investigational
inquiries required by the court of appeals seems small. Rather, sentencing will occur only
if and when the defendants are arrested pursuant to outstanding warrants. Further, even
though a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has entered a guilty plea, judgments

4

See State v. Wheeler, 2001 UT App 276 (memorandum decision) (addendum C);
State v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (memorandum decision) (addendum C); State v. Rogers,
20000812-CA (order dismissing appeal filed Jan. 29, 2002); State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App
43 (memorandum decision) (addendum C); State v. Gardner, 2001 UT App 335
(memorandum decision) (addendumC); State v. Wilkensen, 2000 UT App 383 (memorandum
decision) (addendum C); State v. Payne, 2001 UT App 242 (memorandum decision)
(addendum C); and State v. Bird, 2001 UT App 333 (memorandum decision) (addendum C).
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and convictions, which are usually entered at sentencing, will not be entered until after
defendants are arrested."
The effect will be to allow a "mischievously inclined defendant to profit by his
own wrongdoing" and by "devious and cunning ways" to "render[] helpless and
impotent" the administration of justice by the courts. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111
(quoting Myers, 508 P.2d at 42-43). A defendant might "possibly absent himself for
years," complicating sentencing decisions when he is finally apprehended. Id.
Further, the effect may be to chill the willingness of judges to release defendants
awaiting sentencing. This would be unfair to defendants who would not abscond. See id.
These are the very results that this Court addressed in reaching the decisions that the court
of appeals now ignores.
Finally, the judicial system already provides adequate remedies for the "tiny
minority" of defendants who may be sentenced while involuntarily absent. Sentencing
judges often express their willingness to reopen sentencing if, following sentencing, the
defendant approaches the court with a reason for his absence. For example, the trial
judge told defense counsel in this case, if defendant "is in touch with you or shows up
before he's arrested, then you may approach me." R. 54:3. Even without that
"Failure to timely enter a conviction and judgment may have unanticipated collateral
consequences. For instance, a court cannot enter a probation order restricting the possession
of weapon by the perpetrator of a domestic violence offense until after a conviction is
entered. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-5.1 (1995). Similarly, until a bnbery conviction is
entered, it cannot be used to impeach a defendant at a subsequent trial. See Utah R. Evid.
609(a)(2).
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willingness, however, a defendant has several avenues to challenge his sentencing He
may file a motion to set aside the sentence, appeal, or file an action for post-conviction
relief See, e g , State x Coles, 688 P 2d 473, 473-4^4 (Ltah 1984) (remand for new trial
where absent defendant later demonstrated absence was due to mistake of counsel) *
This Court should determine, as a matter of policy, that the law, as it existed before
Wanosik, appropnately presumes voluntanness where a defendant has been notified of his
sentencing heanng, but is absent without explanation, and that it properly allocates to the
defendant the burden to present a reason for his absence following notice. Defendant in
this case, like "the vast majonty of court no-shows," "[did] not have a legitimate excuse
for not appeanng for sentencing." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, «[20 n 10 & ^ 26 A
presumption of voluntanness will not leave the tiny minonty of "no-shows," who may be
sentenced despite an involuntary absence, without remedy.
II.
RULE 22(a) DOES NOT REQUIRE A TRIAL COURT TO
AFFIRMATIVELY SEEK SENTENCING INPUT FROM DEFENSE
COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTOR, EVEN WITHOUT A REQUEST
OR OBJECTION
The court of appeals held that the tnal court violated Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of
Cnminal Procedure, because it did not meet its "affirmative obligation

b

to extend the

The court of appeals' decision does not question the adequacy of these remedies tor
defendants who are involuntanly absent, but mav not be found despite the extensive
investigational mquines required of the State
15

opportunity to be heard" to defense counsel and to the prosecution. Wanosik. 2001 I T
App 241, Iffi 30-32. The court of appeals misapprehended the rule's reach.
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity
to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
Rule 22(a) requires that the trial court afford a defendant the opportunity to
address the court prior to sentencing. The rule, much like the common law right of
allocution, "contemplates permitting a convicted defendant to speak prior to the fixing of
sentence in order to provide the defendant a chance to present a plea in mitigation;' State
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 372 (Utah 1993) (opinion of Durham, J., joined in the result and
apparently in the analysis of this issue by Zimmerman & Stewart, JJ.). By statute, "courts
must permit allocution at the sentencing phase, when requested/' Id.
The court of appeals has pointed to no precedent suggesting that rule 22(a)
requires a court to affirmatively extend an invitation to speak to a defendant, much less to
his counsel or to the prosecution. This court has held that "[t]he failure of the trial court
to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to say before
sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional error." State
v. Kelbac/h 461 P.2d 297, 299 (Utah 1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S.
935 (1972). Further, while this Court has not determined whether the failure of a trial
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court to ask a defendant whether he has anything to say violates rule 22(a), it has
suggested that such failure does not of itself violate the rule. "[Cjourts must permit
allocution at the sentencing phase, when requested" State v. Young, 853 P.2d at 372
(emphasis added).
Even were this Court to require trial courts to affirmatively offer defendants an
opportunity to speak prior to sentencing, it would not necessarily follow that trial courts
must, as the court of appeals opined, "afford a voluntarily absent defendant the
opportunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel," i.e., affirmatively invite
defense counsel to speak. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, «[ 30. Nor would the policy
considerations that might favor an express invitation to a defendant similarly favor an
express invitation to defense counsel.
Judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, while not
controlling here, is instructive. Federal rule 32(c)(3) requires a sentencing court to
•

"afford defendant's counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the
defendant," and

•

"address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant
wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
the sentence."

Interpreting this rule, the Fifth Circuit held that "the burden rests with the court to make
sure the defendant understands that he has the neht to sav anvthing he wants before the
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sentence imposed." United States v. Vasquez. 216 F.3d 456, 458-459 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000).

In other words, the trial court must extend an affirmative

invitation to the defendant to speak. A defendant need not make a request. But, with
respect to affording a right to defense counsel to speak, "the court does not have the same
burdens . . . as it does personally with the defendant. Consequently, it follows defense
counsel should bear the burden of objecting if no opportunity is afforded." Id. at 458.
The Fifth Circuit made the reasons for this distinction clear. "The court is
confident that competent members of the bar will speak up during a sentencing hearing on
behalf of their clients when counsel has a matter they would like to bring to the court's
attention." Id. Because a defendant may not know that he has a right to speak out on any
subject of his choosing prior to sentencing, the court must make sure that the defendant
understands. Id. "There is no need for this rationale to be applied to counsel's nght to
speak, since attorneys already know they have a right to speak on behalf of their clients."
Id. at 459.
As a matter of policy, it makes little difference whether defendant is or is not
present. Attorneys know they have a right to speak in behalf of their clients. If they have
mitigating information to proffer, they need only request the opportunity to present it.
Should sentencing proceed with no opportunity to present such information, they can
object.
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Further, placing the onus on the trial court to solicit sentencing information from
both defense counsel and the prosecutor may encourage invited error. Defense counsel
having only penpherally important information to offer, for instance, could silently permit
the trial court to proceed with sentencing, "preview" the sentence, and, if not satisfied,
appeal, claiming that the trial court did not invite their input.
Finally, requiring the trial court to solicit sentencing information from defense
counsel and the prosecutor, who are both competent to request the opportunity when
desired, may lead to absurd results. That possibility is suggested by the court of appeals
memorandum opinion in Stare v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (addendum C), where the
court of appeals applied the Wanosik rationale to vacate Hamling's sentence. Observing
that the trial court had given defense counsel the opportunity to provide sentencing
information in the defendant's behalf, the court of appeals nevertheless directed that
"[u]pon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with the procedures set forth in
Wanosik. Such procedure includes giving both the defense and the prosecution the
opportunity to make a statement prior to sentencing." Id. (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). Apparently, the court's failure to ask a prosecutor for information—which
might in many cases result in a list of aggravating, rather than mitigating
factors—constitutes error a defendant may claim under Wanosik.
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In sum, while it may be sound judicial practice for a judge to ask both defense
counsel and the prosecutor whether they have information relevant to sentencing, this
Court should decline to impose an affirmative duty to inquire under rule 22(a).
HI.
A SENTENCE IS NOT "IMPOSED IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER" FOR
PURPOSES OF RULE 22(e) SIMPLY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
FAILS TO AFFIRMATIVELY SOLICIT SENTENCING INPUT FROM
DEFENSE COUNSEL OR FROM THE PROSECUTOR
In a footnote to its opinion, the court of appeals rejected the State's claim that
"Wanosik must show plain error with regard to his rule 22(a) claim because he did not
preserve the claim below." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, *f 28 n.l 1. The court of appeals
then observed "that rule 22(e) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] permits the
court of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the
first time on appeal." Id. This observation constitutes an implicit holding that a trial
court imposes an illegal sentence when it sentences an absent defendant without soliciting
input from both defense counsel and the prosecutor.7 Assuming, but not conceding, that a
trial court errs when it imposes sentence without soliciting such input, the resultant
sentence is not therefore an illegal sentence subject to challenge at any time.
The court of appeals clearly reads Wanosik to hold that a sentence so imposed is an
illegal sentence. See State v. Samora, 2001 UT App 266, at n.l (memorandum opinion)
(defendant "could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e)") (addendum C);
State v. Handing, 2001 UT App 267 (memorandum opinion) (same) (addendum C); State v.
Gardner, 2001 UT App 335 (memorandum opinion) ("sentence was imposed in an illegal
manner") (addendum C); State v. Vicente, 2002 I T App 43, at n.l (memorandum opinion)
(defendant "could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e)") (addendum C).
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Rule 22(e), Utah R. Cnm. P., provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."8 The rule codified
precedent established by Utah courts permitting review of sentences so "obviously
illegal" that "it would . . . be unconscionable not to examine the issue." See Rammell v.
Smitlu 560 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Utah 1977). These included sentences imposed by a court
having no jurisdiction, sentences not authorized by law, and sentences "of an entirely
different character than that which the statute prescribes." Id.
Since 1980, Utah courts have held or reasoned that illegal sentences may occur in
the following circumstances:
•

The sentence provides a punishment that does not conform to the statutes
governing the crime of conviction. See State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d
545, 551 (Utah 1996) (statute %"d[id] not authorize a consecutive,
determinate two-year [enhancement] term"); State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86
(Utah 1991), 86-88 (sentence to indeterminate term was illegal and void
where statute mandated minimum mandatory sentence; corrected sentence
was lawful, even though harsher); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389-90
(Utah 1988) (sentence to indeterminate term with recommended maximum

'Rule 22(e) was enacted as statute in 1980 and codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-3522(e). See 1980 Utah Laws ch. 14, § 1. As with other statutory rules of procedure and
evidence contained in the code, rule 22(e) was repealed as statute and adopted as a court rule
in 1990. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35 (repealed) (1999 Replacement Part); Compiler's Notes.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (2001).
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was illegal where statute requires a minimum mandatory term); State v.
Kenison, 2000 UT App 322, <j<j 6, 14, 14 P.3d 129 (under statute in effect at
the time of sentencing, trial court should have sentenced for misdemeanors,
not felonies); State v. Schweitzer\ 943 P.2d 649, 653-654 (Utah App. 1997)
(statute did not authorize trial court order that defendant's property be sold
to satisfy restitution); State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App.
1996) (statute "d[id] not empower the trial court to impose a determinate
sentence exceeding one year"); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 992-993
(Utah App. 1994) (one-year jail sentence would be illegal where statute
mandated indeterminate one-to-fifteen year term).
•

The sentence is ambiguous. See Parry v. State, 837 P.2d 998, 999 (Utah
App. 1992) (judge's oral pronouncement referred to "aggravated burglary, a
third degree felony," where statute treated aggravated burglary as a first
degree felony).

•

The trial court lacks jurisdiction. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1168
(Utah App. 1997) (trial court lacked junsdiction to revoke probation where
defendant was not charged with probation violation within his original
probation term).

Utah courts have also held or reasoned that alleged errors do not constitute illegal
sentences in the following circumstances:

~>~>

The defendant challenges the conviction, not the sentence. See State v.
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, If 8, 994 P.2d 1243 (merger claim was challenge to
conviction, not to sentence; review under rule 22(e) was error); State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-860 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address
defendant's argument that 'his convictions for robbery and burglary
illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime/' appellate court stated
that it could not "review the legality of a sentence under rule 22(Q) when the
substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to
the underlying conviction"); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App.
1991) (argument that defendant was convicted for conduct prohibited both
by arson and aggravated arson statutes was not a challenge to the imposition
of an incorrect and therefore void sentence and could not be raised for the
first time on appeal); see also State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah
1994) (argument that mens rea for second degree murder and manslaughter
did not differ and that defendant should have been sentenced to the lesser
manslaughter penalty was not a challenge to an illegal sentence that could
be corrected at any time under rule 22(e)).
The trial court bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors. State v.
Wareham, 801 P.2d918, 919-920 & n.2 (Utah 1990) (defendant asserted
that sentencing enhancement was based on aggravating factors committed
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prior to the date of the enhancement statute and therefore in violation of ex
post facto protections; court held that issue should have been raised on
appeal and any error would not render sentence illegal under rule 22(e)).Q
Defendant's claimed error does not constitute an illegal sentence under Utah law.
His sentence is not similar to those Utah courts have declared illegal. The tnal court did
not impose a statutorily unauthorized sentence. The sentence was not ambiguous.
Jurisdiction was not lacking.
At most, defense counsel and/or the prosecution may have had additional
information relevant to sentencing that may have favorably influenced defendant's
sentence. Thus, the alleged error is certainly of no greater import than the error alleged in
Wareham, i.e., sentencing on the basis of inappropriate factors.
Wareham's analysis therefore appears to control here. An allegation that a
sentencing decision may not have been fully informed (Wanosik) should not render a
sentence illegal if a sentence actually based on inappropriate factors (Wareham) is not
illegal. If error occurred in the trial court, it did not render the sentence illegal and
subject to challenge at any time. Error, if any, is subject to appeal, but only via the
normal channels of appellate review. A defendant claiming that a trial court erred by
failing to solicit sentencing input from defense counsel and from the prosecution must

"But cf. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45,^6 n.1,975 P.2d 476 (stating in dicta that
ex post facto claim based on resentencing after completion of onginal sentence and voluntary
withdrawal of plea would be proper under rule 22(e)).
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therefore preserve that claim below or demonstrate plain error or exceptional
circumstances on appeal. Defendant did not, and the court of appeals erred in addressing
his claim as if it constituted a challenge to an illegal sentence.
Further, as a matter of policy, this court should not treat defendant's alleged error
as an illegal sentence. In determining what kinds of errors constitute illegal sentences,
courts must attempt to ''balance the need for the finality of convictions and sentences with
the goal of ensuring that criminal defendants do not serve sentences imposed contrary to
the requirements of law/' Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173, 1176 (Fla. 2001); see also
State v. Murray, 744 A.2d 131, 134 (N.J. 2000).l,)
Several consequences attach to the classification of a sentencing error as an illegal
sentence. First, an illegal sentence is reviewable at any time, a characteristic affecting the
!0

Florida and New Jersey courts have systematically addressed the definition of illegal
sentences. Florida courts have defined an "illegal sentence" as a sentence that "imposes a
kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly
inflict under any set of factual circumstances." Carter, 786 So.2d at 1181. Examples include
sentences that exceed the maximum statutory period for a particular offense or that fail to
credit a defendant with jail time served. Id. A sentence is not illegal simply because it
encompasses a "patent sentencing error[]." Id.
In New Jersey, a sentence "in excess of or otherwise not in accordance" with statutory
mandates is illegal. Murray, 744 A.2d at 134. A sentence may also be illegal where "it was
not imposed in accordance with law." Id. at 135. A sentence may fail, for instance, to satisfy
required statutory presentencing conditions and, as a result, its imposition would not be in
accordance with law. Id. In New Jersey, where statute prohibits the confinement of a
defendant in a youth correctional facility after he has served a prison sentence, sentencing
to a youth facility can constitute a sentence "not imposed in accordance with law." Id.
Likewise, where statutory law mandates a term of parole ineligibility, a sentence that fails
to include that term is "not imposed in accordance with law." Id.
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finality of judgments. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 22(e). Further, because an illegal sentence is
a void sentence, a new sentence imposed after vacation of an illegal sentence is not
restricted by the terms of the illegal sentence and may be harsher. See BabbeL 813 P.2d
at 88. Indeed, the State (not just the defendant) may seek vacation of an illegal sentence.
The State may claim, for instance, that the punishment imposed is less severe than the
punishment statutorily mandated. See id. at 86. In light of these factors, courts have
carefully restricted the kinds of sentencing errors that may render a sentence illegal.
Under Utah law, a rule 22(e) illegal sentence is a "sentence that does not conform
to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted" or a sentence "imposed in an
illegal manner." State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 n.2 (Utah App. 1994). It is a
"patently" or "facially illegal" sentence. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860 ("patently illegal");
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 654 ("patently illegal"); see also Edwards v. State, 918 P.2d 321,
324 (Nev. 1996) ("facially illegal"); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 661 A.2d 6, 8 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) ("patently illegal"). In other words, the sentence's illegality will usually
be apparent upon review of the relevant statutes, the conviction, and the sentence
itself—without recourse to other portions of the record—because the terms and
conditions of the punishment for that offense are impermissible as a matter of law.
In the instant case, the trial court did not solicit input from counsel before
rendering its decision. Defendant did not preserve his claim by objecting to the alleged
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error. The court of appeals, however, reviewed the claimed error, holding that defendant
could assert his unpreserved claim under rule 22(e) as a challenge to an illegal sentence.
The court of appeals erred. Should this Court affirm the decision of the court of
appeals, it would expand the definition of "an illegal sentence" or "a sentence imposed in
an illegal manner" to encompass a wide range of sentencing errors previously subject to
the requirements of ordinary appellate review. Should this Court determine that the
district court imposed an illegal sentence by sentencing defendant without first
affirmatively soliciting input from defense counsel and the prosecution, that decision
would open the door to multitudinous claims of such error, raisable "at any time."
Further, it would open the door to claims by the State that trial courts have erred in
imposing sentences that are too lenient because the court has not invited the prosecutor to
comment.
The issue here is appropriate for review under ordinary appellate procedures, not
for correction under rule 22(e). Alleged error of this kind is not patently in violation of
statute. It is not the kind of error that has traditionally merited review as a possibly illegal
sentence. This court of appeals erred in holding that the alleged error in this case is
reviewable under rule 22(e).
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IV.
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE TRIAL COURT
AFFIRMATIVELY SOLICIT SENTENCING INPUT FROM
COUNSEL; DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS BASED ON RELIABLE
AND RELEVANT INFORMATION
The court of appeals held that "Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised
by the trial court's failure to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information regarding the crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of society."
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 36. The court of appeals apparently concluded that the
failure to (a) solicit information from defense counsel and the prosecution and (b)
articulate the bases for the sentencing decision suggested that the sentence was imposed
solely because of Wanosik's failure to appear. See id. at f^f 34-36. The court of appeals
erred in both respects.
A.

Due process does not require that the trial court affirmatively solicit
sentencing input from either defense counsel or the prosecution.
A defendant has a due process right to sentencing based on relevant and reliable

information. State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). Due process, however,
does not require that the trial court affirmatively solicit sentencing input from either
defense counsel or the prosecution. This Court has previously ruled that Wk[t]he failure of
the trial court to ask a defendant, represented by an attorney, whether he has anything to
say before sentence is imposed (allocution), does not in itself constitute constitutional
error." Kelbach, 461 P.2d at 299. If the failure to solicit allocution from a defendant in
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attendance does not violate constitutional protections, a fortiori the failure to solicit
sentencing input from defense counsel in a defendant's absence cannot be constitutional
error. Likewise, failure to solicit input from the prosecutor, who does not represent
defendant, cannot violate a defendant's due process rights.
B.

The court of appeals ignored relevant and reliable record evidence supporting
the trial court's sentence and disregarded the presumption of regularity
properly accorded to proceedings of the trial court.
The court of appeals stated that i4[t]he record in this case fails to disclose any

relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that defendant was absent from the
proceeding, relied on by the trial court in imposing maximum—albeit
concurrent—sentences for both crimes." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, % 30. Further, the
court observed, "From all that appears in the record, however, Wanosik's absence at
sentencing was the only information considered by the trial court in deciding what
sentences to impose/' Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals disregarded
other record evidence upon which the trial court may have relied and disregarded the
presumption of regularity usually accorded to proceedings of a trial court.
•1.

The court of appeals disregarded relevant and reliable record evidence
supporting the trial court's sentence.
The trial court had before it the record in this case. In addition to the minutes of

defendant's plea-taking and his plea statement, both indicating the nature of defendant's
convictions, the record included the information charging defendant. R. 5-7, 18-24, 2728. The probable cause statement indicated that an officer had discovered defendant in an
29

apparent act of theft. R. 6. The officer detained defendant, discovered an outstanding
warrant, arrested defendant, and conducted a search incident to the arrest. Id. During the
search, the officer found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. R. 6-7.
Further, he found that defendant was carrying five knives. R. 7. The record also
indicated that the trial court had caused another arrest warrant to issue following the filing
of the information because it found "reasonable grounds to believe defendant [would] not
appear on a summons." R. 1.
Additionally, a PSI had been prepared. PSI (R. 52); see also R. 54:2. The PSI
recounted the contents of the probable cause statement and also indicated an extensive
history of criminal offenses. R. 52:2, 4.
While the PSI investigator recommended a twenty-day jail term followed by
probation, his summary included the following statements: "[T]he present offense is
[defendant's] fifth misdemeanant arrest. He has some substance abuse history but denies
involvement with drugs at this time. Obviously Mr. Wanosik was less than completely
truthful about his abuse history." Id. at 9. The summary also noted that defendant's
"conviction for retail theft was sent to warrants six times." Id. at 10.
Based on the information in the PSI and in other parts of the record, the trial court
could reasonably have determined that defendant was not a good candidate for probation.
Defendant's criminal history, his drug abuse, his denial of a drug problem, his past
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repeated failures to appear, and the facts of the instant offense are all relevant and reliable
factors upon which the tnal court could have based its sentence.11
2.

The court of appeals disregarded the presumption of regularity properly
accorded to proceedings of the trial court.
Discussion at the sentencing hearing focused on defendant's absence. See R. 54.

The court of appeals therefore presumed that the trial court considered only defendant's
absence when it imposed "maximum—albeit concurrent—sentences" for defendant's two
drug convictions. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^ 34-36. That presumption
contravened legal precedent that accords a "presumption of regularity" to proceedings o(
the tnal court. See State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) (where record was
silent as to why motion was denied, reviewing court does not assume either error or
prejudice); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1983) ("[i]n the absence of record
evidence to the contrary, we assume regulanty in the proceedings below"); State i\ Scott,
447 P.2d 908, 910-911 (Utah 1968) (where record is not clear as to what happened, *'[w]e
must presume that the proceedings in the court were conducted according to law").
The trial judge in this case did not state that he was fixing sentence based solely on
defendant's absence. See R. 54. While he did not refer to record documents or to any
specific evidence upon which he relied at sentencing, absent evidence to the contrary, the

"A tnal court abuses its discretion in fixing a sentence "only if it can be said that no
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the tnal court." State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d
885, 887 (Utah 1978).
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court of appeals should have presumed that he relied on all the relevant information
before him.
This Court has held, in the context of consecutive sentences, where consideration
of certain enumerated statutory factors is mandatory, that "the trial court's silence, by
itself" does not "presuppose[] that the court did not consider the proper factors as
required by law. To do so would trample on the deference this court usually gives to the
sentencing decisions of a trial court." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, If 11, 40 P.3d 626. !: If
it is proper to assume that a trial court considered all relevant factors in imposing
consecutive sentences, it seems at least equally proper to assume that a trial court
considered all relevant factors in imposing concurrent sentences.
In sum, record evidence sufficed to support the imposition of maximum concurrent
terms. Nothing suggests that the trial court disregarded this relevant information and
imposed sentence based solely on defendant's failure to appear. The court of appeals'
decision disregards the record evidence and fails to accord a "presumption of regularity"
to the trial court's sentencing proceedings.

!2

The Court suggested three exceptions to this rule: "where (1) an ambiguity of facts
makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that vvntten findings
must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings on an issue must be made." Helms.
2002 UT 12, <f 11. No statutory or case law requires explicit findings for the imposition of
concurrent terms in this case. Further, no ambiguity of facts makes the assumption
unreasonable in this case.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and affirm defendant's district court
conviction.
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(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615)

H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and Appellee.
v.
Anthony James WANOSIK, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20000541-CA.
Aug. 16,2001.
Defendant who pleaded guilty to drug charges in the
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis
Frederick, J., and was sentenced in absentia.
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme. J.,
held that: (1) defendant was not entitled to explicit
warning that, even if defendant were absent, the court
might proceed with sentencing; (2) sentencing court
was required to inquire into defendant's ability to
appear at sentencing proceeding, and State was
required to make preliminary showing of
voluntariness of defendant's absence, before
sentencing court could decide that defendant had
waived his right to be present; (3) sentencing court's
failure to properly inquire into whether defendant's
absence at sentencing hearing was voluntary was
harmless error: and (4) sentencing court's failure to
hear evidence from prosecutor and defense counsel at
sentencing hearing was not harmless error.
Vacated and remanded.

sentencing; this waiver must be voluntary and involve
an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rules
Cnm.Proc., Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[4] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Defendant was not entitled to explicit warning that,
even if defendant were absent, the trial court might
proceed with sentencing, and thus defendant's
voluntary absence from sentencing proceeding after
he pleaded guilty did not bar trial court from
pronouncing sentence.
Rules Cnm.Proc. Rules
17(a)(2). 22(b).
[5] Sentencing and Punishment <&=?345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
To require an explicit warning that sentencing will
proceed even in the defendant's voluntary absence is
to conclude that, without such a warning, defendants
will assume they have the nght to avoid sentencing
simply by refusing to appear. Rules Cnm.Proc.
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[6] Criminal Law <®=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufficient to allow a
defendant to exercise the right to be present by
appearing, or to waive that nght through voluntaryabsence. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

West Headnotes
[ 1 ] Sentencing and Punishment <@=^341
350Hk341 Most Cited Cases
A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages
of trial includes the right to be present at sentencing.
[2] Criminal Law <®=>636(1)
U0k636(t) Most Cited Cases

[7] Criminal Law <§=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
A defendant need not be warned that the proceedings
may go forward in his absence in order to deem
voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the right to be
present. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[S] Sentencing and Punishment <5=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases

To intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the
defendant must have notice of the proceedings. Rules
Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[3] Sentencing and Punishment <§=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's right to be present at all proceedings may
be waived by defendant's voluntary absence from

Sentencing court was not required to conduct analysis
as to whether the public interest in proceeding with
sentencing clearly outweighed the interest of the
voluntarily absent defendant in attending the
proceeding; neither federal rules nor federal
constitution required such a balancing test. Rules
Cnm.Proc, Rules l7(a)<2), 22(b).
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[9] Criminal Law €=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
The fact that a defendant was informed of the time
and place of the proceeding allows a court to presume
that a defendant's absence therefrom is knowing, i.e.,
that the defendant knows he is missing the
proceeding; the fact that an absent defendant had
notice of the proceeding does not, however, allow a
presumption that absence therefrom is voluntary.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[10] Criminal Law <§=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
A trial court may not assume a defendant's knowing
absence is voluntary, but rather is required to
determine whether a defendant's absence is in fact
voluntary. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[11] Sentencing and Punishment <S=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court was required to inquire into
defendant's ability to appear at sentencing
proceeding, and State was required to make a
preliminary showing of the voluntariness of
defendant's absence, before sentencing court could
decide that defendant had waived his right to be
present at sentencing.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[ 12] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The voluntariness of defendant's absence from
sentencing proceeding may not be presumed by the
trial court; rather, an inquiry into the defendant's
ability to appear at the proceeding is required. Rules
Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[13] Sentencing and Punishment <@=*345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The voluntariness of defendant's absence from
sentencing proceeding is determined by considering
the totality of the circumstances. Rules Cnm.Proc,
Rules 17(a)(2). 22(b).
[14] Sentencing and Punishment <®==?345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The state carries the burden of showing the
voluntariness of defendant's absence from sentencing

proceeding. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[15] Criminal Law <S=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay
away from the trial; if his absence is deliberate
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his
absence. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[16] Sentencing and Punishment <§=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
When defendant is absent from sentencing
proceedings, the State must make a preliminary
showing, based on reasonable inquiry, that
defendant's absence is voluntary; except as otherwise
required by the attorney-client privilege, defense
counsel has an obligation to aid the State by being
forthcoming with any information defense counsel
may have that could be helpful in determining the
defendant's whereabouts or reasons for the
defendant's absence.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[17] Sentencing and Punishment <®==? 341
350Hk341 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 350Hk582. H0k582)
When neither court nor counsel have information as
to why the defendant is not present at sentencing, a
continuance will ordinanly be required to allow the
prosecution and defense counsel an opportunity to
inquire into the defendant's whereabouts and the
reasons for his absence. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[18] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Some avenues for establishing voluntanness of
defendant's absence at sentencing proceeding are: (1»
inquiry of law enforcement agencies to determine
whether defendant is incarcerated; (2) inquiry of local
hospitals as to whether defendant is admitted to one
of them; (3) inquiry of defendant's employer, if
employer can be readily determined, as to employer's
knowledge of defendant's whereabouts; (4) a
reasonably diligent attempt to contact defendant at his
residence or other place counsel knows defendant to
frequent; (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or other
entity supervising defendant's presentence release;
and (6) inquiry of any bail bond company or other
person or entity posting bond to secure defendant's
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appearance. Rules Cnm.Proc., Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[19] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k345)
Once inquiry appropriate to the case has been made,
and a compelling reason for the defendant's absence
at sentencing proceeding remains unknown,
voluntariness, while not guarantied, may then be
properly inferred; however, defense counsel must
then have the opportunity to rebut the inference of
voluntariness. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2),
22(b).
[20] Criminal Law <§=> 1166.14
11 Ok 1166.14 Most Cited Cases
A trial court's error in failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry into whether a defendant's absence was
voluntary does not merit reversal unless the defendant
was prejudiced by the lack of adequate inquiry.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[21 ] Criminal Law <£=> 1177
110k! 177 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court's failure to properly inquire into
whether defendant's absence at sentencing hearing
was voluntary was harmless error, where defendant,
after being apprehended, sent letter to sentencing
court stating that defendant did "not have a legitimate
excuse" for appearing for sentencing.
Rules
Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[22] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
[22] Sentencing and Punishment <®==>360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
Defendant, by his voluntary absence at sentencing
proceeding, waived the right to personally make a
statement at sentencing and to personally present
information in mitigation of punishment or to show
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed:
however, sentencing court was required to afford the
defendant the opportunity to exercise his allocution
rights through counsel. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[23] Sentencing and Punishment <S=s356
350Hk356 Most Cited Cases

m the rule of criminal procedure which allows
defendant to make a statement at sentencing is
referred to as "allocution." Rules Cnm.Proc. Rule
22(a).
[24] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
Allocution is an inseparable part of the right to be
present at sentencing, which a defendant waives by
his voluntary absence. Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[25] Sentencing and Punishment <®=:>360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
A defendant does not altogether waive his allocution
rights through voluntary absence at sentencing; he
waives only the right to personally exercise them.
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[26] Criminal Law <§=>641.13(7)
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases
Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding
at which a defendant is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel, and the right to effective
assistance of counsel cannot be waived through
voluntary absence alone. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6;
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[27] Sentencing and Punishment<§=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Even when defendant is voluntarily absent from
sentencing, and thereby waives his nght to allocution,
trial court is required to afford defense counsel
opportunity to make statement in mitigation of
sentence and to give prosecutor opportunity to
present information relevant to sentencing. Rules
Cnm.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[28] Criminal Law <S=» 1177
11 Ok 1177 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court's failure to hear evidence from
prosecutor and defense counsel at sentencing hearing
uas not harmless error, even though defendant
voluntarily failed to appear at sentencing; defense
counsel had to be given an opportunity to present
information in mitigation o( punishment and
prosecutor had to be given an opportunity to present
information relevant to sentencing. Rules Cnm Proc.
Rule 22(a).

A defendant's personal exercise of the rights granted
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[29] Constitutional Law <£=>270(2)
92k270(2) Most Cited Cases
The state due process clause requires that a
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing
a sentence. Const. Art. 1, § 7.
[30] Sentencing and Punishment <®=>40
350Hk40 Most Cited Cases
[30] Sentencing and Punishment <@=>66
350Hk66 Most Cited Cases
[30] Sentencing and Punishment <S=?90
350Hk90 Most Cited Cases

Before JACKSON. Associate
ORME and THORNE. Judges.

Presiding

Judge.

OPINION
ORME. Judge:
*! 1 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik appeals the
sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to his
guilty pleas to attempted unlawful possession or use
of a controlled substance and unlawful possession or
use of a controlled substance, class A and B
misdemeanors, respectively, each in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2000).
We
vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.

BACKGROUND
A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate
for the defendant in light of his background and the
crime committed and also serve the interests of
society which underlie the criminal justice system.
Const. Art. 1, § 7.
[31 ] Constitutional Law <S=>270(2)
92k270(2) Most Cited Cases
[31 ] Sentencing and Punishment <§^94
350Hk94 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's state due process rights were violated by
sentencing court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information
regarding the crime, defendant's background, and the
interests of society, and basing the court's decision
solely on defendant's voluntary absence at sentencing.
Const. Art. 1. § 7.
[32] Criminal Law <®=> 1177
HOkl 177 Most Cited Cases

*! 2 The facts are undisputed. Wanosik pled guilty to
two misdemeanor drug offenses. At the plea hearing,
the trial court told Wanosik that sentencing would be
held on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m.. and ordered
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP
& P) for preparation of a presentence report. The trial
court did not specifically inform Wanosik that he
could be sentenced in absentia if he failed to appear
for sentencing.
<| 3 Wanosik reported to AP & P. and a presentence
report was completed. AP & P recommended that
Wanosik be sentenced to twenty days in jail with
credit for time served and that he then be committed
to a substance abuse treatment program.
*! 4 A sentencing hearing was held as scheduled on
May 26. 2000.
Wanosik was represented at the
hearing by counsel but did not appear personally at
the hearing or at any other time that morning.
c

Sentencing court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information
regarding the crume, defendant's background, and the
interests of society, and basing the court's decision
instead solely on defendant's voluntary absence at
sentencing, was not harmless error. Const. Art. 1, § 7
*618 Joan C. Watt, Catherine E. Lilly, and Andrea J.
Garland. Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
*619 Mark L. Shurtleff. Attorney General, and
Jeanne B. Inouye, Assistant Attorney General. Salt
Lake Cits', for Appellee.

5 Defense counsel expressed to the court her belief
that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing
but had perhaps written down the wrong date.
Defense counsel asked the court to wait before
issuing an arrest warrant to give counsel time to
locate Wanosik. The court denied defense counsel's
request and proceeded to impose sentence:
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for
his arrest returnable forthwith no bail.
My
inclination is to sentence him today, and I
recognize you would prefer that I did not. but I
am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has
failed to appear today, although I can onl\
assume because he has not been in touch with >oir
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nor has he been in touch with my court that he
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from
these proceedings.
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of
this Court that he serve the term provided by law
in the adult detention center of one year for the
class A misdemeanor crime of attempted
possession of a controlled substance, and six
months for the possession of a controlled
substance, a misdemeanor charge to which he has
pled guilty.
I will order that those terms be
served concurrently and not consecutively, and
that they be imposed forthwith.
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you
or shows up before he's arrested, then you may
approach me, but in the meantime, Mr.
D'Alesandro, you prepare the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order determining
voluntary absent compliance, and that will be the
order.
Defense counsel promptly objected:
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that
order because I don't think that it takes into
account his due process rights or his rights
about—
THE COURT: Right
MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your
order.
THE COURT: Your objection is noted.
I'll
grant him credit for the eight days he served
awaiting imposition or a resolution.
The hearing was then immediately concluded. The
prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandro, was present but made
no statement during the sentencing hearing, and the
court addressed the prosecutor only to direct him to
prepare the court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
^ 6 On June 14, 2000, Wanosik, through counsel,
filed a timely notice of appeal of the sentences
imposed in his absence. Wanosik was arrested a few
months later on the warrant issued at the sentencing.
After his arrest, *620 Wanosik sent a brief
handwritten letter to the trial court in which he
forthrightly acknowledged, with his own emphasis:
"I do not have a legitimate excuse" for being absent at
sentencing.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
c

7 Wanosik makes two general claims on appeal:
(1) that sentencing should not have proceeded in his
absence: and (2) that even if sentencing him in
absentia was proper, the trial court erred by the
Copr. C West 2002 No Clai

manner in which it conducted sentencing.
«1 8 Under Wranosik's first general claim i.e., that
sentencing should not have proceeded in his absence,
we address several distinct issues. First, we address
Wanosik's contention that, as a matter of law, a
defendant's absence at sentencing cannot be deemed
voluntary if the defendant was not warned that
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary absence.
This contention presents a purely legal question,
which we review for correctness. See State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). Second, we
address Wanosik's argument that even if a defendant's
absence is properly deemed voluntary, the trial court
may not proceed with sentencing without first
balancing society's interest m proceeding and the
defendant's interest in being present. This argument
also presents a question of law, which we review for
correctness. See id. Third, we believe that sound
analysis requires us to address whether, in this case.
the trial court's inquiry regarding the voluntariness of
Wanosik's absence was properly conducted.
Specifically, we address the questions of what type of
inquiry is required of the trial court in making the
factual determination of voluntariness; who has the
burden of proving voluntariness; and what type of
evidence may suffice to meet that burden. These are
all legal questions, which, again, we review for
correctness. See id. Finally, we conclude this first
section of die opinion by considering whether any
error by the trial court was harmless.
<! 9 Wanosik's second claim is that, even assuming
proceeding with sentencing in his absence was
appropriate, "[t]he trial court violated due process
and Utah R.Cnm. P. 22[ (a) ] when it sentenced
[Wanosik] without considering relevant and reliable
information and without affording defense counsel or
the prosecutor the opportunity to speak at
sentencing." These assertions require us to interpret
both the mandates of Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the requirements of Due
Process at sentencing. Each of these inquiries pose
questions of law. which we review for correctness.
granting no particular deference to the conclusions of
the trial court. See Brown v Glover, 2000 I T 89. c
15. 16 P.3d 540 (M[T]he interpretation of a rule of
procedure is a question of law that we review for
correctness."); State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 15^,
c
9, 27 P.3d 5^3 ("Issues of constitutional
interpretation are questions of law, which we review
for correctness.").
I. Sentencing in Absentia
to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

31 P 3d 615
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615, *620)

Page

[1][2][3] «! 10 We begin by addressing Wanosik's
claim that the trial court erred by sentencing him in
his absence.
A criminal defendant's right to be
present at all stages of trial includes the right to be
present at sentencing. See State v. Anderson. 929
P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996). "To intentionally
relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must
have notice of the proceedings." Id. at 1110. See
Utah R.Cnm. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b). "However, this nght
may be waived ... [by] the [defendant's] voluntary
absence from [sentencing].
This waiver must be
voluntary and involve an intentional relinquishment
of a known right." State v. Wagstaff, 111 P.2d 987,
989-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted).
[FN1]
FN1. Wagstafl involved a defendant's
absence from tnal rather than from
sentencing. See 111 P.2d at 988-89. The
Utah Supreme Court, however, has
previously relied on both Wagstafj and State
v Houtz, 714 P 2d 677 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam), another Utah case involving a
defendant's absence at trial, in addressing a
criminal defendant's right to be present at
sentencing.
See State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (citing
Wagstaff, 111 P.2d at 990; Houtz, 714 P.2d
at 678).
Likewise, the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure treat identically a
defendant's right to be present at trial and a
defendant's right to be present at sentencing.
See Utah R.Cnm. P. 22(b). We therefore
see no basis on which to distinguish
between trial and sentencing in our analysis
of a defendant's right to be present and a
defendant's voluntary waiver of that right.
*621 A. Specific Warning of Consequences
[4] «[ 11 Notwithstanding that the Utah case law and
rules referred to above appear to require only notice
to defendant of the proceedings and of the right to be
present in order to permit die court to proceed to a
determination whether a defendant's voluntary
absence is a waiver of the nght to be present,
Wanosik argues that a further warning is required.
Specifically, Wranosik argues he was entitled to be
warned that the court might proceed with sentencing
if he were to be voluntarily absent. [FN2]
We
disagree.
FN2. Wanosik references both the Utah
Constitution and the United States
Constitution as well as the Utah Rules of
'Criminal Procedure in making this
argument. However,

[n]o argument has been made as to wh>.
ifwe were to uphold the [sentencing] under
the Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the
result would be different under either the
Utah or the federal constitution. We will
therefore treat the contention as a single
argument with three legal bases rather than
as three separate arguments.
State v Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229. 1232 n. 3
(Utah 1996).
[5][6] <[ 12 To require an explicit warning that
sentencing will proceed even in the defendant's
voluntary absence is to conclude that, without such a
warning, defendants will assume they have the right
to avoid sentencing simply by refusing to appear.
See Taylor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct.
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam)
It is
inimical to the common respect due our governmental
institutions for us to indulge in the presumption that
persons will assume they have the nght to impede the
judicial system by deliberately absenting themselves
from criminal proceedmgs to which they are a party.
See id. ("It seems ... incredible to us ... 'that a
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of
a tnal-where judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are
present and ready to continue-wouid not know that
as a consequence the tnal could continue in his
absence.' " (citation omitted)). [FN3] "The right at
issue is the nght to be present." Id. Notice of the
proceeding is alone sufficient to allow a defendant to
exercise the right to be present by appearing, or to
waive that right through voluntary absence. See id.
Whether it be tnal or sentencing, we must presume
defendants
fully
understand
that
important
proceedings will go forward without them in the
event of their voluntary absence. [FN4] Thus, there
is no need to specially warn defendants of this
obvious fact.
FN3. We acknowledge that a defendant who
tlees in the midst of a trial may have more
reason to know that the proceedings A HI
move forward m his absence than a
defendant who absents himself from
sentencing after entering a guilty plea. We
nevertheless remain unpersuaded that a
warning is required to disabuse defendants
of the belief that they may prevent their own
sentencing through deliberate absence from
the sentencing proceeding. We therefore.
again, do not distinguish between the right
to be present at trial from the right ro be
present at sentencing, in terms of what t>pe
of notice is required to deem a defendant's
voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the
neht to be present See note I
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FN4. Nor is this some unique feature of the
judicial system that will be foreign to the
average citizen. Whether one is a season
ticket holder or a team member, a scheduled
basketball game will go forward whether or
not he or she shows up. If one does not
appear for a scheduled dental or medical
appointment, he or she should expect to be
billed anyway.
If one misses an
employment interview without prior
explanation, he or she knows the job will go
to someone else. While the uniqueness of
judicial business makes these examples less
than
perfect,
the
expectation
in
contemporary American society is that one
should appear at duly scheduled events or
be willing to accept the ramifications of his
or her voluntary absence. In most social
and commercial arenas, an expectation of
unexcused absence without consequence is
not the order of the day.
*! 13 Wanosik observes that although neither
Wagstaff nor Anderson addresses whether a specific
warning is required, such a requirement would not be
inconsistent with the holdings of those cases.
However, the only federal case Wanosik cites directly
supporting his proposition that a specific warning is
required to inform defendants that sentencing may
proceed in their voluntary absence is United States v.
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C.Cir.1969), which
held that such a warning is required.
See id. at
1129-30.
The United States Supreme Court has,
however, explicitly rejected McPherson 's holding
requiring such a warning. See Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20
n. 3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3 ("[T]he Court of Appeals ...
disagreed with *622 McPherson, and, in our view,
rightly so."). [FN5] Nonetheless, Wanosik maintains
that McPherson 's holding is good law and cites the
more recent United States Supreme Court case,
Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748,
122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), as "further support for the
McPherson requirement." Crosby, however, does not
undermine Taylor 's rejection of McPherson ' s
warning requirement.
FN5. Wanosik observes that the Utah
Supreme Court has cited McPherson with
approval. See State v. Anderson, 929 P 2d
1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). However, the
Utah Supreme Court's reliance on
McPherson extended only to the proposition
that "[t]o intentionally relinquish the right
to be present, the defendant must have
notice of the proceedings." Id. Nowhere
does Anderson intimate that any further
warning is required.
Indeed, Anderson

implicitly rejects the notion that a further
warning is required by affirming the
sentencing, in absentia, of a defendant who.
although he waived in writing his right to be
present at trial, was not explicitly warned
that sentencing would proceed in his
voluntary absence. See id at 1110-1 1.
c

14 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and holds that, under the
explicit language of that rule, a court may never
commence trial in a defendant's absence. [FN6] See
506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53.
The
Crosby Court also observes, however, that under Rule
43 a defendant's absence after trial has commenced
will automatically be deemed a knowing waiver of the
right to be present, even without prior warning to the
defendant regarding the consequences of voluntary
absence. See 506 U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752.
Thus, like Taylor. Crosby concludes that in
circumstances where the federal rules otherwise allow
for trial in absentia, a warning is not required to
inform defendants that voluntary absence will likelyresult in trial in absentia. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at
261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752; Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20. 94
S.Ct. at 196.
FN6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules ot
Criminal Procedure states in relevant part:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall
be present at the arraignment, at the time o\
the plea, at every stage of the trial including
the impaneling of the jury and the return of
the verdict, and at the imposition of
sentence, except as otherwise provided by
this rule, (b) Continued Presence Not
Required. The further progress of the trial
to and including the return of the verdict
shall not be prevented and the defendant
shall be considered to have waived the right
to be present whenever a defendant, initially
present,
(I) is voluntarily absent after the trial has
commenced (whether or not the defendant
has been informed by the court o\ the
obligation to remain during the trial)[ ]
["] c 15 Significantly, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
differ in an important respect highlighted by Crosb\
Federal Rule 43 treats differently absence at the
commencement oi trial from absence after the
commencement of trial.
See Fed.R.Cnm.P. 43;
Crosbv. 506 U.S. at 258-62. 113 S.Ct. at ""51 -53.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure draw no such
distinction, but rather treat a defendant's absence at

Copr. C West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works

31 P.3d 615
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615. *622)

Page1)

any stage of criminal proceedings similarly to the
federal rule's treatment of a defendant's absence after
commencement of trial. [FN7] Compare Utah
R.Crim. P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed.R.Cnm.P. 43(a)
& (b)(1). Thus, for our purposes, the significance of
Crosby is that it affirms the United States Supreme
Court's view that a warning of the consequences of
voluntary absence is not required to deem a
defendant's absence after commencement of trial
voluntary. Our holding, therefore, accords with that
of the United States Supreme Court when we
conclude that a defendant need not be warned that the
proceedings may go forward in his absence in order
to deem voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the
right to be present. Thus, although at least one state
mandates awarnmg like that required in McPherson.
see People v. Link 291 Ill.App.3d 1064, 226 Ill.Dec.
369, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (1997), we, with the
United States Supreme Court, decline to adopt
McPherson 's holding.
FN7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence
from the trial after notice to defendant of the
time for trial shall not prevent the case from
being tried and a verdict or judgment
entered therein shall have the same effect as
if defendant had been present....
Furthermore. Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(b) states: "On the same
grounds that a defendant may be tried in
defendant's absence, defendant may
likewise be sentenced in defendant's
absence."
*623 *[ 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date and
time of his sentencing. He had the right to appear if
he chose; he had no right to assume the matter could
be taken care of some other time, when he felt more
in the mood to attend. We see no error in the trial
court's failure to specifically warn Wanosik that
sentencing would proceed in the event of his
voluntary absence from the proceeding.
B. Balancing of Interests
[8) *l 17 Relying on two in a line of cases from the
Second Circuit, Wanosik argues that even if a
defendant's absence is properly deemed knowing and
voluntary, a trial court may not proceed unless "the
public interest in proceeding clearly outweighs the
interest of the voluntarily absent defendant m
attending." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 7 3 . 76 (2nd

Cir). cert, denied, 528 U.S. 884, 120 S.Ct. 200. 145
L.Ed.2d 168 (1999). See United States v Fontanel.
878 F.2d 33. 37 (2nd Cir. 1989).
c

18 The Second Circuit acknowledges "that while i it
believes] prudential concerns animate the need for a
balancing of interests before a district court exercises
its discretion to conduct a trial in absentia, all that the
Constitution requires is a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to be present at trial" Mann. P 3
F.3d at 76 (emphasis added). Accord Clark v. Scott.
70 F.3d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied. 528
U.S. 884, 120 S.Ct. 200, 145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999).
The Second Circuit has thus, out of "prudential
concerns," hedged their trial courts' discretion to
proceed in a defendant's absence by imposing a
judicially created balancing test not required by either
the federal rules or the United States Constitution.
W*e decline the invitation to adopt a similar balancing
test in Utah. When a defendant's absence from a
criminal proceeding is properly deemed knowing and
voluntary, the trial court may proceed without further
inquiry or analysis. Therefore, it was not error for the
trial court in this case to fail to balance the public
interest in proceeding against Wanosik's interest in
being present.
C. Voluntariness Inquiry
[9][10][11H 19 We have concluded that a trial court
is not required to warn a defendant that trial or
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary
absence. We have also concluded that a trial court is
not required to balance the public interest in
resolving the matter against the defendant's interest m
being present before proceeding in a defendant's
voluntary absence. However, a trial court may not
assume a defendant's knowing absence is voluntary,
but rather is required to determine whether a
defendant's absence is in fact voluntary. [FN8] See
State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam). We therefore review whether the trial court
in this case properly concluded that Wanosik's
absence at sentencing was actually voluntary.
FN8. The fact that a defendant was
informed of the time and place of the
proceeding allows a court to presume that a
defendant's absence therefrom is knowing.
i.e.. that the defendant knows he is missing
the proceeding. The fact that an absent
defendant had notice of the proceeding joes
not. however, allow a presumption that
absence therefrom is \oluntar\- Sec Hun::.
"14 P 2d at 678.
After all. <uch a
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defendant may be incarcerated on another
charge or comatose in a hospital
*] 20 The sum of the trial court's oral findings and
analysis on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence at
sentencing is the following
[FN9] "I can only
assume because he has not been in touch with
[defense counsel] nor has he been in touch with my
court that he has chosen to voluntarily absent himself
from these proceedings." We do not question the
underlying findings of the trial court, I e, that
Wanosik had not been in touch with counsel or the
court.
These findings, however, suggest nothing
more than that no one knew why Wanosik was absent
With no reliable information on the voluntariness of
Wanosik's absence, the trial court merely assumed
that Wanosik's absence was voluntary [FN 10]
FN9 The trial court's written findings and
conclusions do not substantively differ from
what the court stated orally at the hearing
FN 10 As hereafter more fully explained,
case law rejects the legitimacy of such an
assumption, but it is not intrinsically an
unreasonable one Statistically, the vast
majority of court no-shows spaced it out,
could not muster the courage or effort to be
present, or got sidetracked in some
volitional way Only a tiny minority find
themselves comatose or otherwise
involuntanlv incapacitated at the time of
trial or sentencing
Even those who are
incarcerated, assuming it is in this state,
usually have the means to let their
circumstances be known. Cf In re A E,
2001 UT App 202, % 5, 29 P 3d 31 ("Father
was not transported from the jail for the
trial because he did not inform jail officials
of the trial dates ")
*624 [12][13][14][15] 1[ 21 "[Voluntariness may not
be presumed by the trial court." Houtz, 714 P 2d at
678 Rather, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to
appear at the proceeding is required. See id We
have not previously detailed the type of inquiry
required to determine if a defendant's absence is
voluntary We have, however, outlined some general
principles
Voluntariness is determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances
The state carries
the burden of showing voluntariness.
A
defendant must have a compelling reason to stay
away rrom the trial If his absence is deliberate
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his
absence

State v Wagstaff, lnl P 2d 987. 990 (Ltah
Ct App 1989) (internal quotations and citations
omitted)
This case presents an opportunity to
elaborate on these general principles
[16][17] <1 22 In such circumstances, the State must
make a preliminary showing, based on reasonable
inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary Except
as otherwise required by the attorney-client privilege,
defense counsel has an obligation to aid the State by
being forthcoming with any information defense
counsel may have that could be helpful in
determining the defendant's whereabouts or reasons
for the defendant's absence Wrhen neither court nor
counsel have information as to why the defendant is
not present, a continuance will ordinarily be required
to allow the prosecution and defense counsel an
opportunity to inquire into the defendants
whereabouts and the reasons for his absence
[ 18][ 19] <I 23 Ascertaining whether a defendant's
absence is voluntary will often be difficult if the
defendant is simply a no-show While we need not
in this case definitively prescribe what the State must
do to meet its preliminary burden, and while the
showing it must make will vary with the facts and
circumstances of particular cases, some avenues for
establishing voluntariness are- (1) inquiry of law
enforcement agencies to determine whether the
defendant is incarcerated, see Houtz, 714 P 2d at 678
("When a defendant is in custody, he is not free to
make a voluntary decision about whether or not he
will attend the court proceedings "), (2) inquiry o(
local hospitals as to whether the defendant has been
admitted to one of them, cf State v Ross, 655 P 2d
641, 642 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) ("Trial proceeded
for four days, when on the fifth day, defendant failed
to appear He was found in a Salt Lake City hospital
suffering from a heart attack, diagnosed as minor
His doctor contacted the court and recommended a
one-month continuance"),
(3) inquiry of the
detendant's employer, if the employer can be readilv
determined, as to the employer's possible knowledge
or the defendant's whereabouts, (4) a reasonably
diligent attempt to contact defendant at his residence
or other place counsel knows the defendant to
frequent, (5) inquiry of Pretrial Services or other
entity supervising defendant's presentence release
and (6) inquiry of any bail bond company or other
person or entity posting bond to secure defendants
appearance Once inquiry appropriate to the case has
been made, and a compelling reason for the
detendants absence remains unknown, voluntariness
while not guarantied, may then be properlv interred
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*! 24 Defense counsel, however, must then have the
opportunity to rebut the inference of voluntariness
Defense counsel may by that time have gathered
additional information regarding the defendant's
whereabouts and may, for example, be able to
contend that although no local hospital shows the
defendant as currentlv registered, his roommate says
he took him to the emergency room the previous
evening, suggesting the possible in voluntariness of
the defendant's absence at a proceeding early the next
morning
*] 25 In this case, the State made no preliminary
showing of voluntariness whatever, and the trial court
erred by making "inadequate inquiry into [Wanosik's]
ability to appear *625 on [May 26, 2000] or his
subsequent availability before deciding that he had
waived his right to be present at [sentencing] "
Houtz 714 P 2d at 678
D Harmless Error
[20][21] *| 26 A trial court's error in failing to
conduct an adequate inquiry into whether a
defendant's absence was voluntary does not merit
reversal, however, unless the defendant was
prejudiced by the lack of adequate inquiry See State
v Anderson 929 P 2d 1107, 1111-12 (Utah 1996)
("It stands to reason that a defendant cannot demand
repetition of a trial or sentencing in which he suffered
no unfairness")
When finally apprehended,
Wanosik sent a letter to the trial court candidly
acknowledging 'I do not have a legitimate excuse"
for not appearing for sentencing.
Based on
Wanosik's subsequent concession of actual voluntary
absence at sentencing, we conclude that Wanosik
suffered no prejudice by the trial court's failure to
make adequate inquiry into whether his absence was
voluntary
Accordingly, the court's error in
proceeding to impose sentence was, in this case,
harmless
II Sentencing Procedure
c

21 Wanosik argues that, even if proceeding with
sentencing in his absence was appropriate, M[t]he trial
court violated due process and Utah R Cnm P 22 [
(a) ] when it sentenced [him] without considering
relevant and reliable information and without
atfording defense counsel or the prosecutor the
opportunit\ to speak at sentencing "
\ Rule 22(a)

[22] c 28 We first address Wanosiks claim that the
trial court violated rule 22(a) of the Ltah Rules ot
Criminal Procedure [FN 11] The second paragraph
of rule 22(a) states
FN11 The State asserts that Wanosik must
show plain error with regard to his ruje
22(a) claim on appeal because he did not
preserve the claim below
We observe
'that rule 22(e) [of the Ltah Rules of
Criminal Procedure] permits the court ot
appeals to consider the legalitv of a sentence
even if the issue is raised for the first time
on appeal " State \ Brooks 908 P 2d 8^6
860 (Utah 1995)
The Brooks holding
obviates the need for appellants to show
plain error in asserting on appeal
unpreserved claims that the sentence
imposed by the trial court was illegal Ste
id at 858-60
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
the defendant an opportunity to make a statement
and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed
The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information material to
the imposition of sentence
Utah R Cnm P 22(a) Initially, we must determine
whether Wanosik waived his rights under rule 22(a)
by voluntarily absenting himself from the sentencing
proceeding.
[23][24] <| 29 A defendant's personal exercise of the
rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as
allocution
See State v Anderson 929 P 2d 110"
1110-12 (Utah 1996), State v Kelbach 23 Utah 2d
231, 461 P2d 297, 299 (1969), \acatea and
remanded 408 U S 935, 92 S Ct 2858, }} L Ed 2d
"51 (1972) '[Allocution] is an inseparable part ot
the right to be present, which [a] defendant waived]
bv his voluntary absence ' Anderson 929 P 2d at
1111 Wranosik, therefore bv his voluntarv absence
waived the right to personally make a statement at
sentencing and to personally present information in
mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause whv
sentence should not be imposed See id
f25][26][27] «] 30 A defendant does not. however
altogether waive his rule 22(a) rights through
voluntary absence at sentencing he waives onlv the
right to personally exercise them 'Sentencing is a
critical stage ot a criminal proceeding at which a
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance ot
counsel ' State i Casartz 6>6 P 2d 1Q0> loo"
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(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615. *625)
(Utah 1982), and the nght to effective assistance of
counsel cannot be waived through voluntary absence
alone See State v Bakalov 1999 LT 45 « 16, 9^9
P 2d ~99 (holding that, in order to waive the right to
counsel and "invoke the right of self-representation, a
defendant must in a timely manner ' 'clearly and
unequivocally" ' request [self-representation]"
(citations omitted))
Furthermore, rule 22(a)
unequivocally directs the *626 sentencing court to
"give[ ] [the prosecuting attorney] an opportunity to
present any information matenal to the imposition of
sentence " Utah R Cnm P 22(a)
It would be
patently unfair, in the case of an absent defendant, to
hear only from the prosecuting attorney and not from
defense counsel regardmg sentencing considerations
Thus, we hold that a sentencing court is required to
afford a voluntarily absent defendant the opportunity
to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel
*[ 31 At sentencing in this case, the trial court did
hear briefly from defense counsel on the issue of
Wanosik's absence concerning any "legal cause why
sentence should not [have been] imposed" at that
time, Utah RCnm P 22(a), briefly addressed that
issue as discussed above, and then proceeded to
impose sentence However, before proceeding with
sentencing, the trial court heard from neither defense
counsel nor the prosecutor with regard to
"information in mitigation of punishment" or "any
[other] information matenal to the imposition of
sentence " Id The State argues that under rule 22(a)
the burden rests on counsel to request an opportunity
to present information relevant to sentencing The
State's argument is contrary to the plain language of
the rule and the construction given it in case law
*! 32 The language of the rule is that "the court shall
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation
ot punishment" Utah R Cnm. P 22(a) (emphasis
added)
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative
obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity
to be heard, it does not contemplate the court will
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be
heard
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has
said that rule 22(a) "directs tnal courts to hear
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution
that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed " State
v Howell ^07 P2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) [FN12]
This directive is nowhere made conditional on a
preliminary request by counsel to present the
information
Even if a defendant is voluntarily
absent the trial court has the duty to set its
aggravation aside and impose a reasonable sentence

and to that end the court is required to hear evidence
trom both sides relevant to sentencing The onus is
thus on the trial court to "afford" the defendant and to
'give' the prosecutor the opportunity to present
relevant information [FN13] Utah R Cnm P 22(a)
The trial court in this case erred by not atfording
defense counsel an opportunity to present information
in mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor
an opportunity to present information relevant to
sentencing
FN 12 Howell actually interpreted the
predecessor of Ltah Rule ot Criminal
Procedure 22(a), Ltah Code Ann $
77-35-22(a) (1982) See ^07 P 2d at 118
Current rule 22(a) differs from then-section
77-35-22(a) only in that rule 22(a) omits the
words "in his own behalf from section
77-35-22(a)'s sentence
Before imposing
sentence the court shall afford the defendant
an opportunity to make a statement in his
own behalj and to present any information
in mitigation of punishment ' Ltah Code
Ann § 7"?-35-22(a) (1982) (emphasis
added) See also Utah R Cnm P 22(a)
If anything, deletion of the italicized phrase
emphasizes that while defendant is entitled
to make a statement, he need not personallv
make it
FN 13 We [here] note that it is not just the
defendant, but the State as well that has an
interest in the sentence being based on
accurate information Decisions as to the
type of rehabilitation program if anv to
which a defendant is assigned and the
duration of incarceration both influence the
allocation of scarce personnel and monetarv
resources Such decisions should be based
upon the most reliable data possible as to
each defendant so that this State ma\ deal
with its criminal justice program as
efficientiv as possible
State v Casarez 656 P 2d 1005 1008
(Ltah 1082)
[28] *I 33 Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this ^ase
was not harmless, as the State suggests Had either
detense counsel or the prosecutor been given a
chance to address \? Sc P's recommendation that
Vvanosik be sentenced to 20 davs in jail with credit
tor time served and that he then be comrruned to a
substance abuse treatment program, the sentencing
outcome for Wanosik mav well have been more
favorable than the maximum sentences imposed b\
the trial court Thus we \acate \\ anosiks sentences
and remand tor resentencing
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*627 B Due Process Requirements at Sentencing
[29][30][31][32] <| 34 Due Process considerations
underscore the propriety of our remand for
resentencing The due process clause of Article 1,
Section 7 o( the Utah Constitution, requires that a
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing
a sentence." State v Howell, 707 P 2d 115, 118
(Utah 1985). "A sentence in a criminal case should
be appropriate for the defendant in light of his
background and the crime committed and also serve
the interests of society which underlie the criminal
justice system." State v McClendon, 611 P 2d 728,
729 (Utah 1980). "[T]he sentencing judgef ][has]
discretion in determining what punishment fits both
the crime and the offender," but we have consistently
sought "to shore up the soundness and reliability of
the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in
the exercise of that sentencing discretion." State v
Lpsky. 608 P 2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring
disclosure of presentence report to defendant prior to
sentencing). Although rule 22(a) implements sound
procedures aimed at insuring that the trial court bases
its sentencing decision on such information, a
criminal defendant's right to be sentenced based on
relevant and reliable information regarding his crime,
his background, and the interests of society stands
independent of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(a).
<! 35 The record in this case fails to disclose any
relevant or reliable information, other than the fact
that defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied
on by the trial court in imposing maximum—albeit
concurrent-sentences for both crimes.
Voluntary
absence from sentencing may properly serve as one
factor in determining an appropriate sentence, as it is
an mdirect-but telling-indication of the defendant's
suitability for probation or susceptibility to
rehabilitative efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to
rely upon that fact alone in deciding what sentence to
impose, nor may such absence be punished by
imposing a sentence more severe than is otherwise
warranted.
From all that appears in the record,
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the

only information considered by the trial court m
deciding what sentences to impose.
*] 36 Wanosik's Due Process rights were
compromised by the trial court's failure to base its
sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information regarding the crime, Wanosik's
background, and the interests of society
For the
same reasons noted in the preceding section, the trial
court's failure to base its sentencing decision on
relevant and reliable information was not harmless.
CONCLUSION
1] 37 A defendant informed of the time and place for
sentencing need not be further informed that
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary
absence. Furthermore, a sentencing court need not
balance society's interest in proceeding against a
voluntarily absent defendant with the defendant's
interest in being present before proceeding with
sentencing in absentia. In this case, the trial court's
only error in regard to proceeding in absentia was its
inadequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of
Wanosik's absence. The error was, however, harmless
given Wanosik's later concession that his absence was
indeed voluntary.
*| 38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in not
complying with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(a) by failing to afford defendant, through his
counsel, an opportunity to present information in
mitigation of punishment and by failing to also give
the prosecutor an opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing. This course was also at odds
with Wanosik's Due Process rights, as the court failed
to base its sentencing decision on relevant and
reliable information.
*i 39 We vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for
resentencing.
«I 40 WE CONCUR NORMAN H JACKSON.
Associate Presiding Judge, WILLIAM A THORNE,
Jr, Judge
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM B

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea,
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for
defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence.
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it
with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
(0 Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l )(b),
the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—-00O00—-

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Shepard Wheeler,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000107-CA
FILED
September 27, 2001
ll 2001 UT App 276 [[

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:
Kristine M. Rogers, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Orme.
ORME. Judge:
Our resolution of this appeal is governed by our recent decision in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241 428
Utah Adv. Rep. 10, as acknowledged in the State's supplemental memorandum filed herein at the court's
request. For essentially the reasons explained in Wanosik, we vacate appellant's sentence and remand for
resentencing.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

James Z. Davis. Judge

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—- 00O00—-

State of Utah.
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jon Donald Hamling,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000813-CA
FILED
September 13, 2001
|| 2001 U T A p p 2 6 7 j |

Third District Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:
Nisa Sisneros and Joan Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jon Donald Hamling appeals his sentence imposed in absentia. Hamling pleaded guilty to attempted
possession of a controlled substance, a class A misaemeanor At the time of his plea, he was given a
sentencing hearing date of August 4, 2001. and told to contact Adult Probation and Parole for the preparation
of a presentence report. Hamling was also ordered released pending sentencing. Hamling participated in the
preparation of the presentence report and provided information to Adult Probation and Parole
Hamling did not appear at his sentencing hearing. Defense counsel indicated that she had had contact with
him two weeks prior to the sentencing date, but not since then The court determined that, because Hamling
had not contacted the court and he was not at the sentencing hearing, he had voluntarily absented himself
from the proceedings. The judge gave defense counsel an opportunity to provide sentencing information
Counsel spoke on Hamling's behalf and the judge then without affording the prosecution an opportunity to
address sentencing, imposed a sentence of one year of incarceration, the maximum penalty for a class A
misdemeanor. Defense counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court, which was
denied, and this appeal followed.

In sentencing Hamiing in absentia, the prosecution bears the burden of making a preliminary showing, based
on reasonable inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241 .fl22. 428
Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Only after inquiry, the court, in appropriate circumstances, may infer that the defendant's
absence is voluntary. Id. at fi23. Defense counsel must "then have the opportunity to rebut the inference of
voluntariness." Id. atfl24. The court did not require any evidence from the State and inferred Hamiing was
voluntarily absent based solely on the fact that the defendant was not present and none of the parties had
contact with him within two weeks prior to sentencing.
When neither the court nor counsel have information as to why the defendant is absent, the court should grant
a continuance to allow reasonable inquiry into his nonappearance. Id. at fl22. This court, in Wanosik. set forth
some factors the court may consider in determining whether an absence is voluntary. Id. at t[23.
Upon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with the procedure set forth in Wanosik. Id. at fi38. Such
procedure includes giving both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to make a statement prior to
sentencing
Lastly, the State argues that post-sentencing trial court docket entries, made after the defendant was
subsequently arrested, reflect no good reason why the defendant failed to appear at his sentencing. These
later developments have no bearing on whether the defendant was sentenced lawfully as post-sentencing
information was not considered in the court's determination of voluntariness.
We vacate Hamiing's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with State v. Wanosik.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—-00O00—

State of Utah.
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jose Luis Vicente,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No 20000955-CA
FILED
February 14 2002
|| 2002UTApp43

ll

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys;
Joan C. Watt and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jose Luis Vicente appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(m)
(1999).
The issues raised in Vicente's appeal are the same issues determined in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241.
31 P.3d 615. regarding sentencing in absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22
(a) and Due Process rights. Accordingly, Vicente is entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik because the
district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Vicentes absence before
proceeding to sentence him in absentia; (2) provide Vicente with the opportunity to present information through
counsel in mitigation of punishment and also provide the prosecutor an opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing; and (3) base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the
crime, defendant's background, and the interests of society See id. at fflI36-38.
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal
defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the

jurisdiction and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by reinstatement See. e g . State v
Tuttle. 713 P.2d 773, 705 (Utah 1985). Because Wanosik is dispositive of Vicente's appeal and requires a
remand for resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal.11' However, if Vicente appeals the sentence
imposed after remand, the State may raise the dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal.
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Wanosik.

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Vicente could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22
(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Cnm. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct. . a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also Wanosik, 241 UT App at n.11 (stating issues
regarding illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal under Rule
22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal from the sentence and preserve the State's
ability to seek dismissal in any appeal taKen after resentencing.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-—00O00—-

State of Utah.
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Robert Leon Gardner,
Defendant and Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20010378-CA
FILED
November 8, 2001
|l 2001 UTApp335 j[

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:
Joan C. Watt and C. Bevan Corry, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Davis.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Robert Leon Gardner appeals the sentences on his convictions for Shoplifting and Attempted Escape
from Official Custody, both class A misdemeanors. This case is before the court on appellant's motion for
summary disposition.
Appellant raises the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia that this court previously determined in
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. Consequently, appellant is entitled to be resentenced
because the trial court made no inquiry to establish if defendant's absence was in fact voluntary See id. at Tf23
The State seeks, dismissal of the appeal arguing that appellant has failed to demonstrate any harm as a result
of his sentencing in absentia. However, because the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, Wanosik is
dispositive of this appeal and requires us to remand for resentencing.
Accordingly, we grant the motion for summary disposition, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing
in accordance with Wanosik.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge
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PER CURIAM:
Wilkensen seeks to appeal the October 4, 2000 order whereby the trial court sentenced him in absentia
However, the trial court subsequently granted Wilkensen s motion to resentence, vacated the October 4th
sentence, and resentenced Wilkensen on December 1st with Wilkensen present.
An issue is moot when "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." State v Sims. 881
P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994). However, moot issues may be considered if a case "presents an issue that affects
the public interest, is likely to recur, and because of the brief time anyone is affected, is capable of evading
review." Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah Ct App. 1987). This appeal is moot and. though it
presents important issues, these issues will not evade review There are other cases pending before the court.
several of which are briefed, which raise the same issues raised in this appeal. See e.g.. State v. Wheeler.
Case No. 20000107; State v. Wanosik, 20000541; State v Payne, 20000497.
Moreover, because the trial court set aside the sentencing order sought to be appealed, it does not appear that
we have jurisdiction over Wiikensen's appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge
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ORME, Judge:
This appeal raises the same issues.as those raised in State v Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, regarding in
absentia sentencing and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) and Due Process rights
at sentencing. As with the defendant in Wanosik, Payne requests that we vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing. During the pendency of this appeal, however, Payne was resentenced, and at resentencing the
trial court imposed a more lenient sentence than it imposed initially.
Subsequent to Payne's resentencing, we received a Suggestion of Mootness from the State. The State asserts
that at resentencing Payne was afforded those rights he claims to have been denied at his initial sentencingan assertion Payne does not contest-and requests that we dismiss Payne's appeal as moot. We have delayed
ruling on the State's Suggestion of Mootness in order to ensure that our opinion in Wanosik would resolve all of
the issues common to the two appeals.l1)
Wanosik did. however, resolve each of the issues raised in this appeal, and Payne having already received the
resentencing he requests, the State's Suggestion of Mootness is well-taken We dismiss this appeal as moot
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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR.

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

William A. Thome, Jr., Judge
1. Had we been unable in Wanosik to resolve all of the issues raised in both Payne's and Wanosik's appeals,
we would have decided whether to address any remaining issues through a published opinion in this case
under the public policy exception to the mootness doctrine. See generally In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390,fl40,
995 P.2d 17; Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Richard Bruce Bird appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, This case is before the court on appellant's motion for summary
disposition.
Appellant raises the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia that this court previously determined m
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615. Consequently, appellant is entitled to be resentenced
because the trial court made no inquiry to establish if defendant's absence was in fact voluntary. See id. at fi23
The State seeks dismissal of the appeal based upon the fact that appellant remains a fugitive from justice See
State v. Turtle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). However Wanosik is dispositive of this appeal and requires us
to remand for resentencing. If appellant appeals the sentence imposed after remand, the State is free to raise
the dismissal argument based on Tuttle in the subsequent appeal See State v. Samora, 2001 UT App 266 ^3
&n.1, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (per curiam).
Accordingly, we grant the motion for summary disposition, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing
in accordance with Wanosik.
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Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

